The Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe (2014, ADR) finding on no evidence of causality flowing from State fragility to classical corruption or extreme corruption could have an important influence on academic and policy debates. Using updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African countries, we provide evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no violence and corruption-control (corruption). As a policy implication, the finding of the underlying paper maybe more expositional than factual and should be treated with caution.
Introduction
This note is a direct response to Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe (2014, ADR) 
level of corruption and state fragility. In a further assessment with the econometrics of instrumental variables we find evidence of causality neither flowing from state fragility to
classical corruption nor to extreme corruption" (p. 50). We postulate that there should be significant causality for two main reasons. On the one hand, an atmosphere of political instability and/or State fragility should increase the confidence about less impunity and corruption-control because resources allocated in the fight against corruption may not be optimal. On the other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political instability further increases corruption.
Hence, two hypotheses result from the postulation. First, State fragility has a negative effect on corruption-control. Second, State fragility increases corruption.
It is important to investigate these hypotheses because the findings of the underpinnings paper could have an important influence on policy making decisions. The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with policy recommendations.
Data and Methodology
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with annual data from World Bank development indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity begins from 1996 because corruption, corruption-control and political stability indicators are only available from this period.
The scope of the African continent is consistent with the underlying study motivating this note.
We measure State fragility with the political stability or no violence indicator. The corruption and corruption-control indices that are employed as dependent variables are in accordance with the hypotheses stipulated in the introduction. We control for government expenditure, trade openness, GDP per capita growth, inflation and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the firstthree control variables have been adopted by the underpinning study, we have added the last-two for more subtlety in the analysis. Accordingly, the first specifications only involve the first-three while the last-two are included into the conditioning information set in the second specifications (see Table 1 ).
Before diving into the empirical specification, it is relevant to highlight the expected signs from the control variables. Government expenditure should increase corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 2013 , p. 2196 Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008) . Trade openness decreases corruption (Asongu, 2014; Asongu, 2012 Asongu, , p. 2178 . Economic prosperity increases corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 2013 , p. 2196 Asongu, 2013a, p. 63) , decreases corruption-control (Asongu, 2013b, p. 44 ) and per capital economic prosperity also increases corruption (Asongu, 2013c, p. 16) . From intuition, low inflation should be favorable to corruption-control while high inflation should not; essentially because in situations of soaring food prices, many citizens revert to corrupt means to make ends meet. Like trade openness, financial globalization (FDI) is also a powerful tool in the fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014) . The definition of the variables, summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively.
In accordance with Asongu (2013d), we adopt a system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) for three main reasons: it controls for the potential endogeneity in all the regressors, mitigates potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and, does not eliminate cross-country variations. Hence, we prefer the system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) . The two-step approach is preferred to the one-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. Two tests are performed to assess the validity of the models. The
Arellano & Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test and the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR)
test for the absence of autocorrelation and validity of instruments respectively. We control for time-effects and ensure the instruments are less than the number of cross-sections in the specifications by using three-year non-overlapping intervals. Hence, the basic condition for using a GMM technique has been met: N>T (53>5). We do not provide the equations in levels and first difference because the GMM estimation technique is standard and well known. However, details of the specifications and equations could be provided or disclosed upon request.
Empirical results
This section presents the findings of the two main hypotheses outlined in the introduction.
As shown in Table 1 below, but for a thin exception (second specification of corruption), the models are overwhelmingly valid. This is essentially because the null hypotheses of the AR (2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most part 2 . Contrary to the findings of the underlying paper, the two hypotheses are validated, notably: (1) political stability increases corruption-control and; (2) political stability mitigates corruption. In the interpretation of the incidence on corruption, note should be taken of the fact that the corruption perception index (CPI) which is our indicator for corruption is measured in decreasing order by Transparency
International. In this light, high CPI values imply low levels of corruption. The significant control variable has the expected sign. Accordingly, trade openness is a good tool in the fight against corruption (Asongu, 2014) .
2 It should be recalled that, in order to examine the validity of the models, we have performed two tests, notably the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the Sargan-test which examines the over-identification restrictions. The latter test investigates if instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that the instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (that is, they do not suffer from endogeneity). We only report AR(2) in difference because it is more relevant than the AR(1) which detects autocorrelation in levels. Overwhelmingly for almost all estimated models, we are neither able to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation nor the Sargan null for the validity of the instruments. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.
Conclusion and policy recommendations
The Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe (2014, ADR) finding on no evidence of causality flowing from State fragility to classical corruption or extreme corruption could have an important influence on academic and policy debates. Using updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African countries, we have investigated two hypotheses to provide policy makers with the much needed guidance on the issue. We have postulated that on the one hand, an atmosphere of political instability and/or state fragility should increase the confidence of impunity owing to less corruption-control. On the other hand, in the absence such impunity from corruption, political instability further fuels corruption. Our findings have validated both hypotheses. Hence we have provided evidence of a positive (negative) nexus between political stability/no violence and corruption-control (corruption). Differences in findings could result from data, periodicity and methodological variations. Elucidating such variations is not within the scope of this note because its purpose has been to assess if the findings of the underpinning paper withstand more empirical scrutiny. As a policy implication, the finding of the underlying paper maybe more expositional than factual and should be treated with caution. 
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